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Abstract. The paper aims at clarifying the distinctions and relations 
between pain and suffering. Three negative theses are defended: 
1. Pain and suffering are not identical. 
2. Pain is not a species of  suffering, nor is suffering a species of  
pain, nor are pain and suffering of  a common (proximate) 
genus. 
3. Suffering cannot be defined as the perception of  a pain’s 
badness, nor can pain be defined as a suffered bodily sensation. 
Three positive theses are endorsed: 
4. Pain and suffering are categorically distinct: pain is a localised 
bodily episode, suffering is a non-localised affective attitude.  
5. Suffering can be expressed, pains cannot. As a consequence, we 
can have compassion for the suffering of  others, not for their 
pains. 
6. The relation between pain and suffering is akin to the relation 
between danger and fear, injustice and indignation, wrongdoing 
and guilt: suffering is the correct reaction to pain. 
One upshot is that both the influential view that the experience of  
pain is incorrigible and the influential view that the ordinary conception 
of  pain is paradoxical are false. 
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Within contemporary philosophy of  mind, pain gets a lot of  attention, 
suffering very little.  This stands in contrast with other research areas: 1
• Theories of  retributive justice and punishment put the concept of  
suffering at their core.  Wrongdoers, some claim, deserve to suffer. 2
Punishment should therefore consist in making wrongdoers suffer 
in return: inflicting pain is rarely ever mentioned.  
• Torture is standardly defined in terms of  suffering.  Torturing 3
essentially involves making one’s victim suffer, but does not 
essentially involve inflicting pain on them. Waterboarding, sensory 
deprivation, disorientation cause intense suffering but no pain. 
Asymbolics can be tortured, although not pain can be inflicted on 
them. 
• Compassion is typically characterised in terms of  suffering (e.g. 
suffering for someone’s else sake).  Likewise, Schadenfreude is 4
understood as a delight in the suffering –not in the pain– of  others.  
• Discussions about the moral status of  animals typically hinges on their 
capacity to suffer.  5
• Within Christian theology, Christ is said to have suffered for humans 
and sinners are promised eternal suffering.  6
• Clinicians assume that is the suffering of  their patient that needs to 
ultimately be dealt with, not —or not just— their pains. “It is 
suffering, not pain, that brings patients into doctors’ offices in 
hopes of  finding relief ”, writes Loeser 2000 (see also Cassel 1982; 
Cassell 1995). 
• Although utilitarians sometimes speak of  our duty to diminish the 
amount of  pain, utilitarianism is arguably better spelled out in 
terms of  a duty to relieve suffering.  7
 How is it then that philosophy of  mind focusses mostly, if  not 
exclusively, on pain?  One reason, I surmise, is that pain and suffering are 
assumed to be very closely related phenomena. That is, one tends to 
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assume either that pain and suffering are one and the same phenomena 
under different names, or that one is a species of  the other, or that they 
both belong to a same genus, or that one can straightforwardly be defined 
in terms of  the other. If  pain and suffering are such close cognates, then 
it is quite natural to assume that studying pain is not overlooking 
suffering, but rather laying the basis for a proper understanding of  
suffering. 
The view defended here, by contrast, is that pain and suffering are not 
only distinct, but utterly distinct: they neither belong to a common kind, 
nor does the one figure in the essence of  the other. Suffering is an 
attitude, pain is a sensation located in our body. Their relation is not 
subsumptive or essential but rather psychological and normative: suffering 
is the usual and correct reaction to pain.  
Section 1 rebuts an argument to the effect that the pain/suffering 
distinction is a distinction without a difference. Section 2 points out four 
key differences between pain and suffering. Section 3 objects to the view 
that pains are just suffered bodily sensations. Section 4 rejects the view 
that suffering is ever perceiving pain’s badness. Section 5 proposes a 
positive account of  the pain/suffering relation, dubbed the “reactive 
account”. Section 6 answers three objections to the reactive account. 
Section 7 argues that the reactive account undermines both the influential 
view that pain is incorrigible and the influential view that the ordinary 
conception of  pain is paradoxical. 
A methodological comment is in order before we start. The following 
is an essay in descriptive psychology: it intends to describe the distinctions and 
relations between pain and suffering as we ordinarily speak about, think about 
and experience them. This means, first, that any questions about the relation 
between pain (or suffering) and brain states will be bracketed. This means, 
second, that the ordinary understandings of  pain, suffering, and their 
relation is assumed to prevail by default: we need to give reasons if  we are 
to abandon or revise them. 
1. A distinction without a difference?  
Ordinary language distinguishes between having pain, feeling pain, 
suffering pain, and still other attitudes or psychological episodes one may 
entertain towards pain (enduring pain, enjoying pain, being indifferent to 
pain, etc.). But do these linguistic distinctions capture genuine 
psychological differences? Perhaps the grammatical complexity of  
“having a pain”, “feeling a pain” or “suffering a pain” does not reflect any 
metaphysical complexity. One influential consideration to this effect 
pertains to so-called cognate accusatives, such as “feeling feelings”, 
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“dreaming dreams” or “thinking thoughts”.  In such expressions, it is 8
claimed, the verb and its direct object are so closely related that their 
grammatical distinction corresponds to no metaphysical difference.  The 9
argument against the pain/suffering distinction then goes as follows:  
  
P1 In “suffering a pain”, “a pain” is the cognate accusative of  
“suffering”  
P2 The distinction between verbs and their cognate accusatives does 
not correspond to a metaphysical distinction. 
C There is no metaphysical distinction between pain and suffering.  
I believe that both premisses are false. “Pain” is not a cognate 
accusative of  “suffering”. Things other than pains might be suffered 
from: one can suffer from a loss, an injustice, a disease, a discomfort…  
Second and more importantly, even if  “pain” were a cognate accusative 
of  “suffering”, it would not follow that pain and suffering are identical. 
Contrary to the prevailing assumption, the presence of  a cognate 
accusative does not entail the lack of  an underlying difference. Consider: 
“loving a beloved”, “tasting a taste”, "smelling a smell”. Trivial as they are, 
such expressions certainly do not point to an identity of  the loving and 
the beloved, of  the tasting and taste, of  the smelling and the smell. One 
may in fact construe cognate accusatives for all intentional states: e.g. 
seeing visibilia, hearing audibilia, etc. Such expressions are trivial not 
because of  the absence of  an act/object distinction, but rather because of  
the lack of  any substantive information about the object: all we are told 
about the object of  such attitudes is…that they are the objects of  such 
attitudes. Thus, the triviality at stake here is akin to that found in “I see 
what I see”, “I know what I know”: it arises from the violation of  the 
Gricean maxim of  quantity, not from there being a distinction without a 
difference.  
Cognitive accusatives therefore provide no reason to reject the view 
that, in “suffering a pain”, the pain is distinct from the suffering.  10
 The terminology varies: Ryle (1990) speaks of  “cognate accusatives”, Kenny (1966, 8
133) speaks of  “cognate objects”, “nominalization accusatives” or “internal accusatives”, 
and Twardowski (1999) speaks of  “internal complements”.
 See Dummett (2014, 103), Hall (1956), Kenny (1966), Ryle (1990).9
 Essentially the same point is made by Twardowski (1999) with respect to agentive 10
expressions such as “racing a race” or “jumping a jump”, which, he claims, reflect two 
phenomena: the action and its product.
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2  A distinction with four differences 
If  cognate accusatives provide no argument against the pain/suffering 
distinction, can we find arguments in favour of  the distinction? And then 
how should we account for the relations between them?  
A first proposal is that pain is a kind of  suffering, namely physical 
suffering.  A second proposal is that suffering is a kind of  pain, namely, 11
mental pain. A third proposal is that pain and suffering are both of  the 
same general kind (e.g. negative affect; unpleasant sensation…) —see Fig. 
1. What these three proposals have in common is the idea that pain and 
suffering stand in some sort of  subsumptive relation (genus/species, 
determinable/determinate…) to each other. In this sense, pain and 
suffering are held to be of  the same kind.  
Fig. 1 
I believe, on the contrary, that pain and suffering do not stand in any 
subsumptive relation: one is not subsumed under the other, and they are 
not both subsumed under the same genus. This is because suffering is an 
attitude while pain is a non-intentional episode. The first essential difference 
between pain and suffering is then this:  
Intentionality: Pains are non-intentional episodes, whereas 
suffering is intentional: it is an attitude directed towards something 
distinct from itself.  
Which kind of  attitude is suffering? Suffering has a negative hedonic 
valence, which suggests that suffering is an emotion. 
Although this way of  construing the pain/suffering distinction is 
rather unusual within analytic philosophy, Feldman (1997b; 2004) has 
worked out a cognate distinction between two kinds of  pleasures –
attitudinal pleasures and sensory pleasure– that has been influential. The 
chief  thing that distinguishes sensory from attitudinal pleasures, Feldman 
claims, is that sensory pleasures are non-intentional sensations or feelings 
 See Carruthers (2004), Brady (2018a).11
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(the feelings we get from a massage, from an orgasm, from a fresh beer), 
while attitudinal pleasures (“taking pleasure in” or “enjoying”) are 
intentional: they are attitudes directed towards something distinct from 
themselves. Some quibbles aside,  I suggest that we model the pain/12
suffering distinction on Feldman’s distinction between attitudinal and 
sensory pleasures —although I shall disagree with Feldman's account of  
the relation between attitudinal and sensory affects. 
Importantly, Feldman’s distinction between attitudinal and sensory 
pleasures is not a distinction between two species of  the same kind. 
Hence, the fact that we use the word “pleasure” to refer to both kinds of  
phenomena is somewhat misleading. There is indeed a link between 
attitudinal and sensory pleasures but the link is not that of  having 
something in common. What Feldman’s calls the “heterogeneity problem” — 
the problem of  spelling out what pleasures have in common in virtue of  
which they are pleasures— is restricted to sensory pleasures (and, he 
might have added, to attitudinal pleasures). But sensory and attitudinal 
pleasures have nothing in common. (More cautiously, since they may fall 
under the genera temporal beings, phenomena, affects…—  they do not fall 
under a same proximate genus.) The question that arises with respect to 
these two kinds of  pleasures is not what they have in common, but how 
they are related –what Feldman calls the “linkage problem” (to which I shall 
come back to later). The same applies, I submit, to pain and suffering. 
They belong to different categories, and the question is not what they 
have in common (Feldman’s “heterogeneity problem”) but how they are 
related (Feldman’s “linkage problem”). 
Many philosophers will object to Intentionality that pains are  widely 
agreed to be experiences or mental states, and that these are intentional. 
Representationalists, for instance, equate pains with the perception of  
bodily damages; evaluativists equate pains with the perception of  some 
bodily disturbance as bad; equates it with a mental state directed towards 
some sui generis bodily quality.  13
I do no wish deny that there is an extended sense of  the word “pain” 
in which it is used to denote mental states. Nor do I wish to deny that 
pains are systematically experienced in a way colours or sounds aren’t (the 
strength of  the necessity at stake here is a tricky issue). However I do 
believe that the view that word “pain” primarily refer to a mental states is a 
philosopher’s invention. A first argument to this effect is that one finds 
no intentional constructions with the word “pain” in ordinary language. 
One cannot “pain” something. While “taking pleasure in something” 
arguably expresses attitudinal pleasure, it jars to say “taking pain in 
 See Massin (2013) for discussion.12
 See again Massin (2013).13
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something”.  I can think of  four possible counterexamples to this claim, 14
none of  which are conclusive. 
First, one may reply that we speak of  the “experience of  pain”. 
However the “of ” here is not specificatory (as in “a book of  economics”) 
but intentional (as in “a perception of  a tree”). An experience of  pain, is 
not an experience of  the pain sort, but an experience directed at pain. 
Second, one may point out that when we say of  a person that she is in 
pain, we mean that she in some specific mental state. I agree that being in 
pain is mentalistic. But this is not because “pain” here refers to a mental 
state. This is because “being in” stands for “experiencing”, “suffering”, 
“being absorbed in”, “enduring” or some other mental attitude one may 
entertain towards pain.  Something similar may hold for “having a pain” 
which is often used to mean “experiencing a pain” (an extended use 
which is understandable, given that having a pain typically goes along with 
experiencing that pain). In this respect, it is quite telling that many 
representationalist and evaluativist theories of  pain take as their 
explanandum not “pains” but “pain experiences” or  “having a pain”. By 
doing so, I suspect, they change the explanandum from pains to experiences 
of  pain —and should therefore consistently equate  pains  with the bodily 
damages, or bad bodily damages, such experiences are allegedly about. 
Third, one may stress that although “taking pain in something” is 
indeed incorrect,  “taking great pains to do something” is correct. And 
this, one may then press, is clearly an intentional pain-construction. But 
note first that in many translations of  the construction “taking pain to”, 
the word “pain” disappears (e.g. “se donner du mal/de la peine” in 
French,  “sich bemühen/sich Mühe geben” in German). Second and 
more importantly, “taking pains to do something” does not mean that 
pains are mental states directed at the action, but that the action is 
accomplished with great care. It is not that pain are directed at the action, 
it is rather the action is effortful. 
Finally, one may press that common constructions such as “her 
marriage pained me”, or “the pain of  losing a child” are clearly 
mentalistic. But these are presumably extensions of  the primary meaning 
of  “pain”, such as when we say that we are have an itch to do something, 
that we are burning with curiosity, that an idea tickles us, that we are 
 While Feldman (2002b, 2004, 84) uses the expression “attitudinal pains” to refer to the 14
polar opposite of  attitudinal pleasures or enjoyment, I think “suffering” is the right term. 
Unlike “attitudinal pain” (and “disenjoyment”, which Feldman also uses), “suffering” has 
the advantage of  not being a term of  art. Besides, “attitudinal pain” is unfortunate, for 
pain primarily refers to a kind of  bodily sensation (unlike "pleasures"). The view adopted 
here —“suffering” is the opposite of  “enjoying”— is endorsed by Scheler (1973, 27 n.
23) and Mulligan (2008).
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touched by a compliment, that our conscience pricks us, that we feel a 
pang of  guilt, or that remorse stings. Brentano (1995: 84) claims that the 
primary sense of  “pain” is mental, and that it is only by equivocation that 
we come to call “pain” the bodily state corresponding to it —an 
equivocation akin to one at play when we say that our nose is our shame, 
or that the loss of  a friend is a great sorrow. I maintain that exactly the 
reverse is true. Brentano is right that in some cases (shame, sorrow), 
primarily mental locutions come to apply, by extension, to physical 
objects. But he fails to notice that in other cases, we come to apply to 
mental episodes terms that originally apply to bodily states. This is 
precisely often the case with bodily sensations, as just suggested: “tickles”, 
“itches”, “prangs”, “burns”, “stings”, “pricks”…and “pains,” primarily 
refer to bodily states but can, by extension, be used in a mentalistic fashion. 
Ordinary language therefore clashes with the view that pains are 
intentional mental states. The second argument in favour of  the view that 
pains are not mental states directly stems from the second essential 
difference between pain and suffering, which, I submit, is this: 
Location: Pains have a bodily location, whereas suffering has no 
location.  
We experience, think and speak about pains as being located in our 
body, even if  sometimes diffusely. Pains are not the only negative 
sensations than have bodily location: itches, hunger pangs, nauseas, 
general bodily feeling such as fatigue or being cold are also felt as located 
in our body. But suffering is not one of  these. We do not experience 
suffering, nor do we think and speak about suffering as being located. 
Like enjoying and other attitudes, suffering is not given as located.  15
While common sense, ordinary language and experience unhesitatingly 
ascribe bodily location to pains, philosophers have been reluctant to take 
the idea that pains have a bodily location at face value. Two main worries 
have been raised. The first directly follows from the philosopher’s view 
that pains are mental: 
P1 Pains are mental phenomena. 
P2 Mental phenomena lack bodily location (from the standpoint 
of  descriptive psychology).  
C Pains lack bodily location. 
I have already suggested that P1 is false on linguistic grounds. 
Assuming the truth of  P2 is true, I consider this argument to be in effect 
a reductio of  P1. If  a philosopher’s view entails that pains lack bodily 
location, then that view is probably false. Faced with a choice between 
 See also Scheler (1973: 333, 413).15
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pains being mental or pains being located, we should unhesitatingly 
embrace the later. 
The second objection commonly raised against the location of  pains 
stems from a failure of  transitivity: from the fact that I have a pain in my 
finger, and that my finger is in my mouth, it does not follow that I have a 
pain in my mouth. Tye (2017) draws the conclusion that ordinary talk 
about pain as bodily located, taken literally, is false: “In saying that the 
pain is in a leg, we speak as if  the pain itself  is inside the leg, when in 
reality it is a representation that represents something else inside (or on 
the surface of) the leg.” While this sounds like a dismissal of  our ordinary 
way of  speaking, Tye suggests that it is not, for talk about pains as located 
is not meant to be taken literally: “Such talk is common. A drowning 
feeling is not itself  drowning. Rather it is a feeling that represents to its 
subject that he or she is drowning. […] Correspondingly, a pain in a leg is 
a feeling that is in a leg only in the sense that it represents something (to 
wit, a disturbance) in a leg.” The expression “the pain in my foot”, Tye 
suggests, is a mere façon de parler that is not intended to be taken literally. 
I disagree. While there is no doubt that “a drowning feeling” is a façon 
de parler, when we speak of  the pain in our foot, we do mean it literally: we 
mean that the pain is really there in our foot –and that it is really a pain. 
This corresponds to our experience: we also feel the pain as being located 
in our foot, and we can feel a pain move up our thigh. From both the 
standpoint of  ordinary language and descriptive psychology, pains are 
really located in our bodies. On the other hand, considerations about what 
pains represent –if  pains represent  anything– are utterly absent from our 
naïve picture. Thus Tye's proposal that pain is not bodily located is nolens 
volens strongly revisionary.   16
What then should we say about the intransitivity of  pain's location? 
That is, how should we handle the following inconsistent triad: 
i. Pain is located in body parts. 
ii. Being located in is transitive.  
iii. If  pain is located in a body part, and if  that body part is located in 
some container, the pain is not necessarily located in the container. 
The correct answer is not to reject (i), pace Tye, but (ii): being located in 
is not always transitive.  True, from the fact that Paul has a pain in his 17
finger and that his finger is in his mouth, it does not follow that he has a 
pain in his mouth.  But from the fact that Paul has a tumour in his finger 
 For a full defence of  the view that pains are genuinely located in our body, see Hyman 16
(2003).
 Noordhof  (2001, 2005).17
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and that his finger is in his mouth, it does not follow either that he has a 
tumour in his mouth. Yet his tumour clearly has a bodily location.  18
How is it that being located in is not transitive in such cases? The sense in 
which pains, tumours, but also holes, pressures, vibrations etc. are located 
is peculiar in two respects. First, these phenomena are located not in 
empty space but in other bodies. Second, for these phenomena, being 
located in another body is not just being located at the place were a part 
of  this body is located. To be located, for pain, holes or vibrations, is also 
to modify or affect the body in which they are located. Following Hyman 
(2003) and Noordhof  (2005), pains belong in the category of  modes or 
states: they are not merely located at the place occupied by body parts; they 
modify those parts. Pain location, I submit, must then satisfy two 
conditions: 
 Pain location: a pain p is located in a body part iff:  
  (i) p occupies a place within that body part;  
  (ii) p modifies that body part at that place (i.e. the body  
  part is hurting as a result). 
The reason why pain location is non-transitive lies in (ii): the location 
of  pain, holes, tumours, vibrations, pressures or flaws (unlike the location 
of  bodies, persons or cities) is a kind of  “modifying location”.  
There appears to be no good reason to give up the common sense 
view that pains are located in body parts. A more exotic way of  
challenging the location criterion of  distinction between pain and 
suffering, is to grant that pain is located, but to argue that suffering also is. 
One may think of  two arguments to that effect. First, materialists may 
retort that suffering is located in our brain. But recall that the view 
defended here is meant to be descriptive: in our natural understanding, 
enjoying, believing, seeing, remembering, suffering... are mental episodes 
that have temporal location, but lack spatial location. How far is your 
seeing of  a dog from your pride at having won a game? In which 
direction? Such questions make no sense. Besides, even if  it were granted 
that suffering is located in our brain, it would remain true that pains, by 
contrast to suffering, can be located in other parts of  our body.  
Finally, one may try to defend the location of  suffering by relying on 
expressions such as “suffering in the flesh” and “suffers in her body". I 
rejected Tye’s suggestion that “I have a pain in my foot” was a mere façon 
de parler. Yet it seems clear that “suffering in the flesh” and the like are 
 One might reply that there is a sense in which we  do have a tumour in our mouth 18
when we have a finger with a tumour in our mouth. But in that sense, I submit, we also 
have a pain in our mouth when our painful finger is in it.
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mere façons de parler. The “in” here does not indicate the place of  the 
suffering but rather the place of  what we suffer from.  
The third distinction between pain and suffering pertains to 
expressibility. The proposal is that while pains, being sensory, cannot be 
expressed, suffering can. Expressing one’s state is not the same thing as 
reporting it. One can indeed report that one has a pain in the toe. But one 
cannot express that pain. Isn’t the grimace on our face or the exclamation 
"ouch!" expressions of  that pain? No: these express our suffering from 
that pain. To see the plausibility of  this proposal, consider a tinnitus. One 
can report having tinnitus, but one cannot express one’s tinnitus. One can 
however express one’s annoyance at it. Or consider a slight sensation of  
pressure on one’s neck. One can report having such a sensation, but one 
cannot express pressure sensations. One can however express one’s 
delighting in it. Likewise for pain: pain being a non-intentional bodily 
episode, like tinnitus and bodily pressures, one cannot express one’s pain, 
one can only express one’s suffering it.  
Expression: We cannot express our pain, but we can express our 
suffering. 
This third difference between pain and suffering helps explain the 
fourth and last difference: one cannot have compassion or sympathy for 
the pain of  others  –that is, one cannot have pain with them– but one can 
have compassion for their suffering –that is, one can suffer with them. 
When someone has an intense pain in the foot, one cannot have a pain 
with him, but one can suffer with him: it is with the suffering arising from 
his pain that we sympathise, not with his pain. Likewise, Julie cannot 
sympathise with Paul’s tinnitus, but she can sympathise with the 
annoyance that the tinnitus causes to Paul.  
This is not to say that we can have no representation of  the pain of  
others. Rather, the best one can do here is it to imagine oneself  having a 
similar pain, to put oneself  is somebody else’s shoes. Scheler calls “feeling-
after” (Nachfühlen) the imagination of  the pain of  others, where we 
affectively reproduce a similar pain in ourselves, and contrast it with the 
“feeling-with” (Mitgefühl) such as compassion, which presupposes that we 
access the very mental state of  the other person.  The fourth distinction 19
between pain and suffering is then this: 
Compassion: One can have compassion for the suffering of  
others, but not for the pain of  others.  
 Compare De Vignemont and P. Jacob (2012).19
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The idea traces back to Adam Smith, who endorses a weaker version 
of  the view to the effect that sympathy for pains must be of  a lesser 
degree than sympathy for suffering:  
[...] this is the case of  all the passions which take their origin 
from the body: they excite either no sympathy at all, or such a 
degree of  it, as is altogether disproportioned to the violence of  
what is felt by the sufferer. 
It is quite otherwise with those passions which take their origin 
from the imagination. The frame of  my body can be but little 
affected by the alterations which are brought about upon that 
of  my companion: but my imagination is more ductile, and 
more readily assumes, if  I may say so, the shape and 
configuration of  the imaginations of  those with whom I am 
familiar. A disappointment in love, or ambition, will, upon this 
account, call forth more sympathy than the greatest bodily evil. 
Those passions arise altogether from the imagination. The 
person who has lost his whole fortune, if  he is in health, feels 
nothing in his body. What he suffers is from the imagination 
only, which represents to him the loss of  his dignity, neglect 
from his friends, contempt from his enemies, dependance, 
want, and misery, coming fast upon him; and we sympathize 
with him more strongly upon this account, because our 
imaginations can more readily mould themselves upon his 
imagination, than our bodies can mould themselves upon his 
body. (Smith, 2002b)  
Scheler endorses the stronger view that compassion for the pain of  
others is impossible: 
Two parents stand beside the dead body of  a beloved child. They 
feel in common the “same” sorrow, the “same” anguish. It is not 
that A feels this sorrow and B feels it also, and moreover that they 
both know they are feeling it. No, it is a feeling-with-each-other [Mit-ein-
ander-fühlen]. […] It will be evident that we can only feel mental 
suffering [Leiden] in this fashion, not physical pain [Schmerz] or 
sensory feelings. There is no such thing as a “pain-with” [Mitschmerz]. 
Sensory types of  feelings (feeling-sensations [Gefühlsempfindungen] as 
Stumpf  calls them), are by nature not susceptible of  this highest 
form of  feelings-with [Mitgefühls]. They must somehow become 
"objectual". They arise only compassion [Mitleid] “with” and “upon” 
the suffering of  pain by the other person. Likewise, there is certainly 
such a thing as rejoicing-with [Mitfreude] and upon another’s sensory 
pleasure, but never sensory-pleasure-with [Mitlust]. (Scheler, 2008, 
12-13, translation modified; see also Scheler, 1973, 335, 340-341). 
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Why is it, as Smith puts it, that “our imaginations can more readily 
mould themselves upon his imagination, than our bodies can mould 
themselves upon his body”?  How is it that we can have compassion for 
the suffering of  others, but not for their pain? One natural explanation is 
this. Since pain cannot be expressed, one cannot perceive the pain of  others —
no more than one can hear their tinnitus. By contrast, since suffering 
might be expressed, typically through grimacing, one can perceive their 
suffering. Now to sympathise with someone's emotions, one must 
arguably have direct awareness, typically perceptual, of  these emotions. If  
this is true, only expressible states can become objects of  sympathy. 
Under this plausible assumption, the third criterion of  distinction 
between pain and suffering, Expression, entails the fourth one, Compassion.  
The four distinctions between pain and suffering are recapped in Table 
1.  20
Table 1:  Four differences between pain and suffering 
3 Pains are not suffered bodily sensations 
I have rejected two views about the relation between pain and 
suffering: (i) that they are identical; (ii) that one is a species of  the other, 
or that the two are species of  a common kind. Those tempted to 
downplay the pain/suffering distinction might still argue, however, that 
although pain and suffering indeed belong to distinct kinds, one can be 
Location Intentionality Expression Compassion
Pain ✓ ✕ ✕ ✕
Suﬀering ✕ ✓ ✓ ✓
 These do not exhaust the differences between pain and suffering. Scheler (1973: 334 20
sqq.) notices further differences, which I only mention here en passant: 
(i) Pain cannot be emotively remembered (re-felt), whereas suffering can.  
(ii) There is make-believe or imaginative suffering, but there is no make-believe pain;  
(iii) Attending to suffering typically diminishes it, but attending to pain does not modify pain. 
(iv) Pain is transient, suffering is endurant (in a quite specific sense, see Scheler, 1973: 90-92);  
Scheler also seems to think that: 
(v) Pain and bodily pleasure are not essentially incompatible (a pain and a bodily pleasure can 
occupy the same bodily place), but suffering and enjoyment essentially are (one cannot enjoy 
and suffer exactly the same thing, under exactly the same respect, in exactly the same way).
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defined via or reduced to the other. I now turn to rejecting proposals of  
this sort. Pain and suffering are not only different in kind: neither figure in 
the nature of  the other. 
The first account I want to rebut is this:  
 Suffering account of pain: pains are suffered bodily episodes.  
 This account of  pain belongs to the same family as accounts that 
equate pain with an averted or disliked sensation. One chief  proponent of  
a suffering account of  pain is Feldman (1997b; 2004). Feldman argues 
that sensory pleasures are alike in virtue of  being the objects of  attitudinal 
pleasures, and that sensory pains are alike in virtue of  being the object of  
attitudinal pains (which I prefer to call suffering, see note 14). This allows 
him to solve both the heterogeneity and linkage problems: what unites the 
heterogenous sensory pains is their relation to attitudinal pain. For x to be 
a sensory pain is (simplifying a bit) for x to be the object of  some 
attitudinal pain.  
Here are six problems for the suffering account of  pain. 
1. Hunger. Bodily sensations other than pains can be suffered. One can 
suffer from an itch, a discomfort, the sensations of  cold associated 
with the flu, hunger, etc. As noted above, not all unpleasant bodily 
sensations are pains, although many if  not all may give rise to 
suffering. One way out for the suffering account of  pain would be 
to isolate which kinds of  bodily sensation needs to be suffered in 
order to count as a pain. But then why not call “pains” those very 
sensations, prior to their being suffered (which would also avoid the 
other problems below)? And why endorse the suffering account in 
the first place if  we are able to solve the heterogeneity problem –
the question of  what all pain sensations have in common– before 
having introduced suffering? 
2.  Asymbolia. Some subjects, though they claim to have pains, also 
claim not to be bothered by them. Taking these subject’s reports at 
face value, one is led to the conclusion that pains do not essentially 
displease, are not essentially disliked or suffered. Faced with such 
cases, upholders of  the suffering account of  pain have to dismiss 
the reports of  the subjects who claim that they feel pain but do not 
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suffer it.  It would however be better not to dismiss as false such 21
reports. A more common example comes from the enjoyment of  
spicy food. Up to a threshold above which pains becomes 
unbearable, chili likers tend to enjoy the burning pain caused by 
chili (Rozin and Schiller, 1980). 
3.  Euthyphro.  Do we suffer pains because they feel painful/bad, or do 
pains feel painful/bad because we suffer them? The suffering 
account is arguably committed to the latter. Indeed, it would be 
quite odd to claim that suffering a sensation turns it into a pain and 
to deny that suffering a sensation makes it seem painful/bad. 
However, the view that pains seem painful or bad because we 
suffer them puts the cart before the horse. The natural order of  
explanation is that we suffer pains because they seem painful/bad.  22
4. Misidentification. The suffering account of  pain misidentifies what we 
suffer (from). When we walk on a small stone, what we suffer from 
is the ensuing pain and not the non-pain pressure sensation which, 
once suffered, becomes a pain.  Pain is already there when we start 
suffering it. We do not introduce pain into the world by suffering 
initially neutral sensations. 
5. Justification. Like other emotions, suffering can, on the face of  it, be 
justified: one may wonder why –for what reason– a pain is (or 
should be) something we suffered from. Intuitively, the answer to 
that question, will have to be either (i) because pain is painful or (ii) 
because pain is bad. But neither of  these answers are open to the 
suffering account of  pain, since the account is committed to pain 
being painful or bad because we suffer it. On the suffering account 
  Here is Feldman:  21
what happens in such cases [in which people experience pain but do not mind] is 
that the individual experiences a sensation that any normal person would find 
painful–perhaps the individual himself  formerly found similar experiences painful, 
or would find them painful were it not for the drugs or hypnosis or whatever is 
affecting him. Thus, there is some justification for calling the sensations ’pains’. [...] 
But because of  the unusual circumstances, the person does not take intrinsic 
attitudinal pain in his feelings. Thus the feelings (as felt by him on that occasion) are 
not strictly pains. […] we call them ’pains’, but on the proposed analysis they are 
not. (Feldman, 2004)
 A similar problem afflicts desired-based account of  pain, see Bain (2012), Aydede 22
(2014). Brady (2018b) advances a new version of  the desire-based account of  pain which 
avoids this Euthyphro worry. On this new version, it is not the averted pain sensations 
that is painful, but the experience of  having a pain sensation that one wants to cease. If  I 
am right that pains are pain sensations —and that pain experiences are experiences about 
pains— Brady’s new desire view entails pains are not painful (only pain experiences are).
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of  pain, suffering alights somewhat randomly on bodily sensations, 
without reason. 
6. Location. The suffering account of  pain is not compatible with the 
view that pains are entirely located in the body. On this view, it is 
true indeed that the bodily sensation constitutive of  pain is wholly 
located in our body. However that sensation, qua suffered, is not 
entirely located there. The reason is that the suffering element 
essential to pain is not itself  given as located in the body. So an 
essential part of  any pain lacks bodily location. What is strictly 
speaking located in the body is just the neutral sensation: not the 
pain, but its indolent substrate.  
The suffering account of  pain should therefore be rejected: pains 
cannot be defined through suffering, or at least not in this way. 
4 Suffering is not perceiving pain's badness 
Instead of  defining pain in terms of  suffering, one might attempt to 
define suffering in terms of  pain. Suffering, we have seen, is an emotion 
which, like other emotions, is intentional, can be expressed, with which 
one can sympathise, and which is liable of  justification. One influential 
account of  emotions equates them with perceptions of  value. Let us call 
the “perceptual approach to suffering” the following view: 
Perceptual account of  suffering: to suffer is to perceive/feel the 
badness of  a pain. 
Here are six problems for this account: 
1. Loss. That we can suffer from other things that pains (hunger, but 
also loss, disease, poverty…) shows, as we saw, that the suffering 
account of  pain fails to give a sufficient condition for having 
pains. It also shows that the perceptualist account of  suffering 
fails to give necessary conditions for suffering: it is not necessary 
to perceive the badness of  a pain to suffer, one might as well 
perceive the badness of  of  a loss. 
2. Valence. Suffering, like most emotions, has a hedonic valence: suffering 
is essentially unpleasant. But feeling or perceiving x are not 
essentially valenced episodes. The perceptualist’s idea, however, is 
that to perceive x as bad must be unpleasant. That is, the 
presentation of  disvalue necessarily turns the presentation itself  
into something negative. But this idea is far from being obvious. 
Perceiving a ladybird as red does not turn the perceiving into a red 
state; thinking of  an event as past does not turn the thinking into 
a past episode. Why should perceiving a bodily episode as bad 
turn the perceiving into a bad or unpleasant episode? In other 
words, the perceptual account of  suffering faces the problem of  
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explaining how the attitude inherits or gets coloured by the 
disvalue represented in its content. Absent such an account, we 
should stick to the view that the perception of  the badness of  a 
pain is, like other perceptions, neither positive nor negative. 
3. Messenger Shooting. If  suffering just informs us about the badness 
of  our pain, are we irrational each time we want to be relieved of  
our suffering? Shouldn’t we want, on the contrary, to face the 
truth and continue to be informed about the bad episodes 
occurring in our body? Why shoot the messenger?  23
4. Torturing. Here is another way to press this point. Suppose that to 
torture a person is to intentionally make her suffer. Why would 
the torturer want to inform his victim about the badness of  her 
pain? And if  torturing is just informing or making apparent to the 
victim the badness of  her bodily episodes, why is it morally 
problematic? Is it impossible to torture an omniscient being?  
5. Justification. Another problem for the perceptual account of  
suffering stems again from the fact that suffering is capable of  
justification. We may wonder for what reason one suffers a 
sensation or external episode, to which the answer will typically 
be: because it is or feels bad in some way. But while “Why —for 
what reason— do you suffer?” makes sense, the question “Why 
—for what reason— do you experience your pain as bad?” does 
not. Perceptions, experiences, feelings, presentations are not the 
kinds of  states which are liable of  justification, by contrast to 
suffering, emotions or beliefs.  24
6. Reaction. We say both that we suffer pain, and that we suffer from pain. 
The former is intentional and raises no problem for the 
perceptual account of  suffering. The later however suggests that 
suffering is a reaction to pain. But perceiving or feeling are not 
reactions: we can suffer from pain, but we cannot perceive or feel 
from pain. 
To suffer is not to perceive pain's badness. 
 This argument was initially raised by Bain (2012) as a potential problem for the 23
evaluativist theory of  pain, according to which to have a pain is to have an experience of  
a bodily disturbance as bad. Jacobson (2013) generalises the worry to any view that 
analyses pain in terms of  a cognitive attitude.
 This problem is more generally a problem for any perceptual theory of  emotions (see 24
Deonna  and Teroni, 2012; Müller, 2017). See however Tappolet (2016, 40) for a possible 
answer, and Maguire (2018) for doubts about the view that there are reasons for 
emotions. I cannot address these worries here.
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5 Suffering is the correct reaction to pain 
I have argued that pain and suffering are distinct, that neither is 
subsumed under the other or under a common kind, that a pain is not a 
suffered bodily sensation, and that suffering is not experiencing the 
badness of  pains. What then are pain and suffering and how are they 
related? 
My answer to the first question is dull: pain is pain, suffering is 
suffering. From the standpoint of  descriptive psychology, pain and 
suffering cannot be reduced, analysed of  defined in terms of  each other, 
nor, I suspect, in terms of  other phenomena. They have to be accepted as 
primitive. This does not mean that nothing can be said about them. First, 
we can specify the category to which they belong (attitudes, emotions, for 
suffering, bodily episodes, for pains) and some distinctive features they 
have in virtue of  their primitive nature (e.g. suffering is expressible). 
Second, we might describe their relations. What then are the relations 
between pain and suffering –identity, subsumption, and essential 
participation having been excluded?   
There are three main relations between pain and suffering, I submit. 
The first is normative: suffering a pain is the correct emotion to entertain 
towards it: 
Correctness: suffering is the correct emotional reaction to pain.  25
Thus the relation between suffering and pain is akin to the relation 
between fear and danger, indignation and injustice, guilt and misdeeds, 
etc.: the former are the fitting/correct/appropriate affective answer to the 
latter. 
For the sake of  this paper, I will take Correctness to be equivalent to: (i) 
suffering is the appropriate reaction to pain; (ii) suffering is the fitting 
attitude towards pain; (iii) pain is worthy of  being suffered; (iv) if  one is to 
affectively react to pain, then pain ought to be suffered; (v) there are 
normative reasons to suffer pain. Correctness is a normative relation which 
I won't attempt to specify further, apart from the two following points. 
First, correctness is a non-moral relation.  To say that suffering is the 26
correct, appropriate or fitting reaction to pain is not to say that suffering 
pain is morally good, praiseworthy or that we have some ethical duty to suffer 
pain. We can imagine baroque cases where our ethical duty would be to 
adopt an incorrect reaction to pain, such as to enjoy it. Second, to say that 
 Perhaps Correctness should be conditional on pain being felt. Unfelt pains, if  they exist, 25
may not call for suffering. I shall here ignore this complication.
 Ewing (1947), d'Arms and Jacobson (2000); Mulligan (1998) and Rabinowicz & 26
Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004).
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suffering is the correct emotional reaction to pain, is not to say it is 
required to suffer in reaction to pain. Another permitted option is to fail to 
react affectively to pain. 
Here is a short consideration in favour of  Correctness. Pain is widely 
thought to be bad in some way (typically to be bad finally, personally and 
pro tanto; see Massin 2017). It is also typically agreed that bad things call 
for negative affective reactions. One is then naturally led to wonder what 
the correct reaction to pain is. It is hard to think of  a better candidate 
than suffering.  Of  course, pain may also, and appropriately so, annoy us, 27
make us despair, angry, distressed, fearful, depressed etc. But such reactions are 
arguably not just reactions to the pain, but to specific aspects of  the pain 
or to elements associated with it. We might despair at the chronicity of  a 
pain, or be annoyed by its recurrence. A pain can make us angry because 
it was avoidable, etc. By analogy, that dangers may appropriately depress 
us, annoy us or tire us, constitutes no objection to the view that fear is the 
fitting affective reaction to danger. 
The second relation between pain and suffering is psychological: we 
normally suffer pain because it feels bad (and not the reverse, as 
mentioned above against the suffering account of  pain). That is, our 
suffering from a pain is an answer to its seeming bad:  28
Reaction: suffering from a pain is an emotion that arises in reaction 
to the felt badness of  that pain. 
This echoes the recurring claim that emotions are answers, responses 
or reactions to (the objects of) evaluations, a claim which entails that 
emotions are not themselves evaluations (pace the perceptualist account of  
emotions). 
What is it to affectively react to pain being presented as bad? One 
possibility is that “x is a reaction to y” simply means “x is caused by y”: 
the experience of  pain's badness would cause us to suffer. While I think it 
is true that suffering is caused by the feeling of  pain's badness,  it is 29
certainly not the case that any emotions caused by such a feeling should 
count as a reaction to it. There is more to reacting than simply being 
 “Enduring pain” could be an alternative. But what is to endure a pain? My hunch is that 27
enduring a pain is suffering it plus some behavioural element: not to be distracted by it, 
persisting in one’s effort or activity, not complaining, etc. If  this is true, then enduring is 
not really an alternative to suffering.
 I am here assuming following (Brogaard, 2010, 2012) that the logical form of  “x feels 28
F” (in which “feel” is neither comparative, nor epistemic) is “Feels[x is F]”. Badness is a 
property that pains are presented as having.
 Klein (2015a: 48sqq) also points out that pain normally causes suffering.29
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caused. What? To react to the felt badness of  pain is also to adopt the 
ensuing attitude for this very reason. When Marie suffers her pain in the toe, 
she does so for the reason that her pain feels bad. The felt badness is both 
a cause of  and a motivating reason for the suffering reaction. 
One question that naturally arises at this point is this: is pain bad 
because it is worthy of  being suffered, or worthy of  being suffered 
because it is bad (or neither of  these). Let us adopt the following labels: 
Buckpassing:  pain is bad because it is appropriate to suffer pain.   
Naive realism:  suffering pain is appropriate because pain is bad.  
Correctness is compatible with both Buckpassing and Naive realism. 
However, Reaction strongly suggest Naive realism. For if  the felt badness of  
pains is the reason for which we normally suffer pains (Reaction), and if  
the reason for which one should suffer pain never involves pain's badness 
(by Buckpassing), we are forced to conclude that we are always wrong when 
we suffer pains on account of  their felt badness. Unless we want to 
divorce motivating reasons to suffer from normative reasons to suffer, we 
should endorse Naive Realism. This is, I submit, the third relation between 
pain and suffering: 
Naive realism: suffering pains is correct because pains are bad.  
The badness of  a pain is not only the reason for which one normally 
suffers it when one feels it –a motivating reason–, it is also the reason for 
which one should suffer the pain –a normative reason. 
Let us call the conjunction of  Correctness, Reaction and Naive Realism the 
Reactive account of  the pain-suffering relation. 
Reactive account of  the pain-suffering relation: 
 (i) Correctness: suffering is the correct emotional reaction to pain.  
 (ii) Reaction: suffering a pain is an emotion that arises in reaction   
to the felt badness of  that pain. 
 (iii) Naive realism: suffering pains is correct because pains are   
 bad.  
The reactive account avoids all the problems raised against the suffering 
account of  pain: 
1. Hunger. That bodily sensations other than pains can be suffered is 
not a problem for the reactive account, since it neither claims nor 
entails that all suffered bodily sensations are pains.  
2. Asymbolia. Since on the reactive account it is possible to have pain 
without suffering it, asymbolics’ reports can be taken at face value.  
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3. Euthyphro: On the reactive account, pain is not unpleasant or bad in 
virtue of  being suffered, but pain is typically suffered because it is 
unpleasant or bad, in line with the natural order of  explanation. 
4. Misidentification: On the reactive account, it is not the neutral bodily 
substrate of  pain which is suffered, but pain itself. 
5. Justification: While the suffering account of  pain cannot say that we 
suffer pain for the reason that it is bad or painful, this is explicitly 
what the reactive account claims. 
6. Location: In the reactive account, suffering is not part of  the nature 
of  pains, hence pains can be wholly located in the body.  
The reactive account also avoids the pitfalls of  the perceptual account of  
suffering: 
1. Loss. Since the reactive account does not define suffering in terms 
of  the perception of  pain's badness, things other than pain can be 
suffered from –a loss, a disease… 
2. Valence. The reactive account is not committed to the controversial 
view that the perception of  something negative is itself  negative. 
The negativity of  suffering is not derived from the negativity of  the 
pain suffered. 
3. Messenger Shooting. On the reactive account, suffering is not the 
perception the pain's badness but arises in reaction to the perception 
of  pain's badness. Hence wanting to be relieved from our suffering 
is not refusing to face the facts. 
4. Torturing. For the same reason, the reactive account does not equate 
torturers with informers. (One may indeed inform somebody about 
something bad in order to make him suffer, but informing is here a 
means to cause suffering, it is not itself  the suffering.) 
5. Justification. Since on the reactive account, suffering is an emotion 
and is not reduced to a perception, the question “Why —for what 
reason— do you suffer?” is legitimate (contrary to the question 
“Why —for what reason— do you experience your pain as bad?”), 
and finds a natural answer: because pain is painful/bad. 
6. Reaction. The reactive account straightforwardly accounts for the fact 
that we both suffer pain, since suffering is intentional, and that we 
suffer from pain, since suffering is equated with an intentional 
reaction. 
6  Objections answered 
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In spite of  these advantages over the suffering account of  pain and the 
perceptual account of  suffering, the reactive account faces three 
objections that I now want to address.  
Objection 1: It is not appropriate to suffer slight pains 
An objection to Correctness is that is it intuitively unfitting to suffer 
from little pains.  
One natural answer is that suffering from slight pain is fitting as long 
as the suffering is also slight. But the gist of  the objection may be 
precisely that there is no such thing as slight suffering. In the same way 
that nothing can be mildly sublime, fantastic or radiant, or that one 
cannot be slightly exhausted or thrilled, one cannot slightly suffer. 
Granting that “suffering” forbids “slight suffering”, one may however 
argue that there is a perfectly intelligible broader concept of  emotional 
reaction to pain, which encompass suffering for intense pains, but also being 
bothered or being annoyed, for less intense ones. Ordinary language’s lexicon 
may be deficient here, nonetheless the distinction between pain and the 
affective reactions to it is clearly marked in its syntax and semantics. 
Objection 2: We suffer from pains because they are painful, not 
because they are bad. 
One may object to Reaction that it is not the badness of  pain that one 
reacts to when one suffers it, but to its unpleasantness or painfulness.  
My answer is that the distinction between pain's badness and pain's 
unpleasantness or painfulness is a spurious one. Painfulness is a thick 
axiological property. I can't elaborate on this view here (see Massin, 2017 
for a full defence), but here is a short argument. Pain feels painful; pain 
also feels bad. But pain does not feel bad on top of  feeling painful. Once 
we experience the painfulness of  a pain, we do not need to experience a 
further property to be presented with its badness. Unless the experience 
of  pain is systematically delusive, painfulness and pain's badness are one 
and the same property. 
Objection 3: There is no difference between feeling a pain as bad 
and suffering it. 
A second objection to Reaction is that the distinction between feeling x as 
bad and suffering x is without a difference. What is it to feel a pain's 
badness, if  not to suffer it?  
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The claim that value feelings are distinct from affective reaction to 
them is unorthodox, but not unprecedented.  Here are two 30
considerations in its favour, one general, one more specific to pain.  
First, it is quite difficult to offer reasons for emotions without 
appealing, explicitly or implicitly, to the values of  the objects of  these 
emotions. We are amused by a joke for the reason that it was funny, angry 
about somebody because his remark was offensive, enjoy a wine because it 
is balanced, fear a lion because it is dangerous, or like a vase because it is 
delicate. These properties are admittedly all thick values. Now for these to 
count as motivating reasons for our emotions, they must (i) be accessed 
by us;  (ii) be distinct from the emotion they motivate. Hence there must 31
be some mental episodes prior to emotions that present us with the value 
of  the object of  our emotions. Furthermore, (iii) recalcitrant emotions 
suggest that such episodes are often non-doxastic. Hence there are some 
non-doxastic mental episodes with evaluative content that are distinct 
from and prior to emotions and that provide the motivating reasons for 
these emotions. These are the episodes which I stipulatively call “feelings 
of  value”. 
Some sceptics about feelings of  value have tried to satisfy these three 
requisites by denying that motivating reasons or justifiers for emotions are 
evaluative, and by claiming instead that emotions are justified by the 
natural properties grounding values.  Paul's reason to fear the lion would 32
not involve its dangerousness (an evaluative property) but only its having 
sharp teeth (a non-evaluative property). However, this proposal heavily 
relies on a conversational implicature between having sharp teeth and being 
dangerous.  Once the implicature is cancelled, the proposal loses any 33
intuitive appeal. Consider: 
Jules: For what reason do you fear that lion?  
Paul: Because it has very sharp teeth!  
Jules: And these make him dangerous? 
Paul: No, not in the least. In fact, the lion seems totally harmless to 
me. 
 The distinction has been defended by Scheler (1973), Reinach (1989: 104, 279-312), 30
von Hildebrandt (1969), and Mulligan (2008, 2009, 2010a, 2010b), Müller (2017). See 
Vendrell Ferran (2008) and Salice (2015) for presentation of  the role of  distinction 
among early phenomenologists.
 I am here assuming with Dancy (2000) that motivating reasons are reasons in the light 31
of  which one acts (in the present case: react).
 Deonna and Teroni (2012a: 94-97; 2012b).32
 See Müller (2017) for a detailed defence of  that point.33
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Second, there seem to be cases where we feel the value of  something 
without affectively reacting to it. One can thus feel the funniness of  a joke 
without being amused by it (Mulligan, 2008). After several hearings, the 
pleasure we take in listening to a piece of  music decreases, although the 
aesthetic value we hear in it does not disappear. Sceptics about value 
feelings typically reply this way: in such cases one believes or judges that the 
joke is funny, while failing to really feel or perceive its funniness (which, on 
perceptualist accounts, is an emotion). More generally, where defenders 
of  value feelings claim that one can grasp the value of  a thing while 
remaining unmoved– that one can be value-blasé –, their enemies reply that 
one then simply fails to see its value —that one is value-blind. 
This is where pain asymbolia provides a neglected argument in favour 
of  value feelings. Asymbolics report feeling pain after a pinprick, but also 
report that this does not bother them in the least —and behave 
accordingly. The standard take on pain asymbolia is that pain is a 
sensation with two components, one sensory, the other affective, and that 
asymbolic pains lack the affective component. There are two problems 
with the standard account. First, it amounts to dismissing asymbolics’ 
reports: when asymbolics claim to have a pain in the finger, what they 
should in effect say, on the standard account, is that they have a sensation 
which is like pain in only one respect. Second, the claim that asymbolics’ 
pains lack any affective component —that they are, as is commonly put, 
“pains that don't hurt”—  is at odds with the way asymbolics describe 
their experience. Looking at the (very few) reports available, asymbolics 
do report not only feeling pain, but also describe these pains as hurting, 
painful and bad: "Thank you, this was very good, it hurts a lot". [“Danke 
schön, das war ganz gut, das hat mir so weh getan”] (Schilder and Stengel 
1928); “I feel it indeed; it hurts a bit, but it doesn’t bother me”(Pötzl and 
Stengel 1937, 180; see Grahek 2007: 45); “it was bad, please something 
else” [“das war schlecht, bitte schön, noch etwas”] (Schilder and Stengel 
1928).  
It is very hard to make sense of  such reports if  one maintains that 
asymbolics’ pains lack the “affective dimension” of  pain altogether, failing 
to distinguish the painfulness/badness of  pains from their being disliked/
suffered. Once the distinction between the felt badness of  pain and its 
being suffered is recognised however, such reports make plain sense: 
asymbolics experience their pains as painful/bad, but fail to react to them 
by suffering them. They are not unable to fully feel pain, but to correctly 
react to it. Asymbolics’ pains are not pains that don't hurt. They are full-
blown pains, that hurt, are painful and feel bad. They are just pains that 
asymbolics don’t suffer from.  34
 See Klein (2015b) for a partly converging account of  pain asymbolia and Bain 34
(forthcoming) for discussion.
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7. Against Incorrigibility 
The reactive account of  the relation between pain and suffering sheds 
new light on pain's alleged incorrigibility. I take Incorrigibility to be the 
following view: 
Incorrigibility: seeming to have a pain entails having a pain.  
Incorrigibility has been very influential. It is a key assumption of  
Kripke's argument against identity-theories of  mind. Since pain is exactly 
as it seems, Kripke maintains, the identity theorist cannot explain away the 
intuition that the relation between pain and brain states is contingent by 
pointing out that it is in fact the relation between the sensation of  pain and 
brain states which is contingent (as he can do with heat): 
Someone can be in the same epistemic situation as he would be if  
there were heat, even in the absence of  heat, simply by feeling the 
sensation of  heat […] No such possibility exists in the case of  
pain and other mental phenomena. To be in the same epistemic 
situation that would obtain if  one had a pain is to have a pain. 
(Kripke 1980, 152)  
Incorrigibility is also a key premiss of  the so-called “paradox of  
pain” (Hill, 2004, 2005). Our ordinary conception of  pain would be 
paradoxical on the following grounds. On the one hand, we naturally 
think of  pains as being located in body parts, and in this respect we seem 
to be committed to the view that pains are objective bodily conditions. On 
the other hand, we conceive of  pains as being mental, notably because 
they seem incorrigible. If  no mental episodes are located in body parts, 
the ordinary conception of  pain is paradoxical. 
I believe that Incorrigibility is false and that the pain/suffering 
distinction explains both its attraction and why it is false. 
The reason why Incorrigibility is false is relatively straightforward. 
Referred pains — where a pain is felt in a location than other than the 
one in which it is actually located — shows that the felt location of  pain 
can be illusory. 
 “But still, there is a pain, the incorrigibilist replies, it is just elsewhere”. 
No, there is possibly no pain at all. Phantom limb pains — where a pain is 
felt in an amputated limb — show that experiences of  pain can be 
hallucinatory. One cannot have a pain in a limb that does not exist. And 35
unlike referred pains, phantom limb pains are not actually located 
elsewhere in the body. 
“But still, there is a pain, the incorrigibilist replies, it just has no 
location”. No, pains essentially have locations, this is one of  the essential 
 As compellingly argued by Bain (2007).35
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differences between pain and suffering, as we saw. Suppose there were 
pains without location, would there be any natural kind to which located 
and un-located pains belong? 
“How can you claim that a person complaining about an intense pain 
in her limb in fact has no pain? Doesn't she know?” When Julie insists, 
sincerely, that she has an intense pain in her amputated limb, what she says 
is false —she has no pain in her limb, because she has no limb. But what 
she expresses —her suffering— is not doubt real. Julie is genuinely 
suffering from a hallucinatory pain. The plausibility of  Incorrigibility relies 
on a conflation between pain and suffering. One may suffer a pain that 
one does not have, in the same way that one may fear a danger that one 
does not face. Suppose Julie hallucinates that a tarantula is above her and 
insists that she is in real danger. She is not infallible about dangers for all 
that, quite the contrary. But she really is frightened by an hallucinated 
danger. Likewise for her phantom limb “pains”: she has no pain, but her 
pain hallucinations prompts genuine suffering. When we say, with an air 
of  paradox, that Julie is in pain although she has no pain, what we mean is 
that Julie is genuinely suffering in reaction to a hallucinated pain.  
So Incorrigibility is false. I won't elaborate on how this affects Kripke's 
objection to materialism, but I want to say a few words in conclusion 
about how this counts in favour of  the common sense conception of  
pain. Such a conception has been claimed to be paradoxical on the 
grounds that it both maintains that pains are mental and that pains are 
located in our body. I believe it is simply not the case that the common 
sense conception of  pain equates pains with mental episodes. Pains are 
neither experiences nor emotions —but there are experiences of  pain, 
and emotional reaction to experienced pains. For common sense, pain is a 
state of  our body, which one experiences and to which one usually and 
correctly reacts by suffering. In other words, the reactive account is (part 
of) the common sense account of  pain and suffering. This ordinary 
account is not only perfectly consistent, it is also preferable to several 
alternative accounts of  pains.  
First, many alternative accounts of  pain diagnose an ambiguity in the 
ordinary term “pain” which they then disambiguate by introducing 
various technical terms (”pain-experience” vs “pain-quality”; “paine” vs. 
“paino”,”central state” vs “peripheral pain” see e.g. Tye 2006a; 2006b, 
Aydede 2009, Hill, to appear). The present proposal dispenses with any 
technical jargon by relying instead on the ordinary language distinction 
between pains, experiences of  pain, and sufferings of  pain.  
Second, the reactive and ordinary approach to pain and suffering 
proves more fine-grained than several revisionary accounts. Thus, while 
the standard scientific account of  pain relies on a twofold distinction 
between the sensory and the affective components of  pains, the ordinary 
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approach relies on a threefold distinction between having, experiencing 
and suffering pain. Second, while the standard scientific approach rests 
content with componential and causal relations between the two 
components of  pain, the ordinary approach introduces normative 
relations into the picture. 
Third, most alternative accounts of  pain are led to equate pains with 
experiences or feelings (of  bodily damages, of  evaluative properties), and 
as a consequence struggle to account for the location of  pains. The 
ordinary conception of  pain, by contrast, does not compromise on pain 
location.  36
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